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ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to the debate on London’s social class structure at the start of the twenty-
first century. That debate has focussed on the use of census metrics to argue the case for whether or 
not the capital has become more or less middle class in composition between 2001 and 2011. We 
contend that the definition of the middle class has become confused in the course of this debate and 
is of less critical importance for an understanding of the city’s contemporary class structure than is a 
focus on London’s elite. We make use of data from the BBC’s Great British Class Survey (GBCS) to 
shed light on the social, cultural and economic resources of this group, in addition to their spatial 
location. We then return to the census data for 2001 and 2011 and posit that belying the image of 
stability in London’s class structure these data suggest clear and localised patterns of intensification 
in class geographies across the capital, an intensification characterised by a growing cleavage 
between inner and outer London.   
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CONTEXTS 
Since the early geographical information systems (GIS) attempts of Charles Booth to map London’s 
social class structure in the late-nineteenth century, there has been an enduring fascination with the 
geography of inequality in the capital and beyond (Savage et al. 2015: 32). The terms of the debate 
surrounding this interest have changed and reflected broader social and economic shifts away from 
the explicitly moral encoding of Victorian philanthropists like Booth and Rowntree towards a 
concern with the spatial implications of urban de-industrialisation and new working patterns and 
structures in the post-war period. Starting with Ruth Glass’ (1964) identification of ‘gentrification’ to 
describe the social shifts taking place in the inner North London district of Islington, the preeminent 
concern of urban sociologists and geographers has been on the middle classes and their relentless 
colonisation of previously working class areas of our major cities (Atkinson and Bridge 2005: 3-4). 
Given developments since then, and specifically the emergence of a transnational “super-
gentrification” in precisely such areas as Islington (Lees 2003; Butler and Lees 2006), it now seems 
somewhat quaint that we should still alight on the middle classes as the primary agents of urban 
social change in a time in which research shows they are increasingly eclipsed by just such a 
transnational elite (Atkinson 2015; Webber and Burrows 2015; Burrows et al. 2016). Yet it is 
precisely this topic which has provided the focus in recent years for a lively debate about the 
structure of London’s class geographies, and in particular on the extent to which the capital is 
becoming more or less middle class.  
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This particular debate can be seen to have originated with a paper by Butler et al. (2008) arguing 
that London in the late-twentieth century was experiencing an ongoing trend towards ‘social 
upgrading’ ahead of the rest of the country which was in turn driving gentrification, a process in turn 
partly fuelled by an expansion of the middle classes within the city to incorporate greater numbers 
from lower professional and intermediate non-manual groups. Davidson and Wylie (2012) used 
detailed census data from 2001 and 2011 along with factor analysis to present an empirical critique 
of Butler et al.’s middle class expansion thesis, whilst conceptually unpacking this thesis within a 
post-political and neoliberal framework of urban governance which they argued had the dangerous 
potential to neuter the city as a site of class antagonism (Rancière 2004, 2010; Davison and Wylie 
2012: 405; Swyngedouw 2005). Their contribution interrogates and challenges statutory class 
descriptors and opens the way for a fuller consideration of how we might understand class 
structures beyond occupation alone (Savage et al. 1992, 2013, 2015). Manley and Johnston (2014) 
have sought to draw the debate back to a very specific empirical focus on the question of whether 
the middle class has expanded at the expense of the working class. They do this through a spatial 
analysis of the London census data for occupational class at the detailed output area level, arguing 
that such analysis presents an image of stability across the decade within the class fragments they 
have defined as lying within the middle, service and working classes.        
Although these are all important and valuable contributions, they analyse social class using 
conventional occupational class categories, although Davidson and Wylie (2012) have sought to 
enrich their analysis by drawing on a range of other census variables in their factor analysis. We 
argue that these traditional class measures fail to fully register the full implications of urban social 
change in London because of their lack of attention towards the top levels of the social class 
structure. Increasing evidence is showing that on a variety of economic, cultural, political and social 
dimensions the higher end of the professional and managerial service classes are ‘pulling away’ from 
the rest of the middle class (see e.g. Bennett et al., 2009; Laurison and Friedman 2016; Laurison, 
2015; Savage, 2015; Savage et al., 2015) and we need to more effectively use the scant resources at 
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our disposal to analyse this cadre. At a methodological level, some of this research (Savage and 
Burrows 2007; Atkinson 2015; Savage et al. 2013, 2015; Webber and Burrows 2015; Burrows et al. 
2016) points towards the growing significance of research going on beyond academia in the form of 
‘public sociology’ and the need to go beyond the traditional data sources available to us as social 
scientists if our disciplines are to remain relevant (Burrow and Savage 2007, 2014). As Davidson and 
Wylie rightly identify, we are perpetually engaged in a losing battle against the clock in this regard 
(Davidson and Wylie 2012: 404).  
The important role of this elite has been obscured or absented in the previous contributions partly 
because the conventional class categories used by Manley and Johnston (2014) generally place elite 
occupations alongside others in a broader professional and managerial ‘service class’ so that it can 
be difficult to disentangle the distinctive role of the elite from a wider penumbra of relatively 
advantaged occupations. Our contribution addresses this issue using the Great British Class Survey 
(GBCS) which emphasises that the growth of an urban elite class  will be increasingly powerful and 
pervasive in Britain (Savage et al. 2015). We will use our analysis of the GBCS to reflect on the role of 
the elite in the capital’s class structure at multiple scales.  
Our argument will use a two pronged approach. We begin by using the GBCS dataset itself to unravel 
the significance of the elite in London. Because of its sample size and skew, the GBCS is a remarkable 
tool with which to dissect class formation at the top and middle levels of the class structure (Savage 
et al. 2015). We show that to truly understand the subtle changes in the capital’s class geography we 
need to look beyond coarse definitions to understand the intra-stratal divisions and distinctions that 
exist within the city’s upper and middle classes, and which are not adequately captured by standard 
class categories. Building on the arguments of Savage et al. (1992), Bennett et al. (2009) and Savage 
et al. (2013, 2015) which point to clear divisions between the professional and managerial wings of 
the middle classes, we show important geographical fractures between different elements of the 
elite in London. This debate intersects with the recent public debate on the decline of traditional 
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middle class sectors such as academia and accountancy as these professions are increasingly 
eclipsed by the dominance of the financial services sector (Boyle 2013; Neville 2014). The difference 
in incomes between those working in established middle class professions and those in finance, 
medicine and the upper echelons of the legal sector is leading to spatial strains and stresses which it 
is possible to analyse using the GBCS data.      
Having established the significance of the elites we consider their implications for the arguments put 
forward in this journal. We utilise the standard decennial census mechanism for 2001 and 2011. 
Agreeing largely with aspects of Hamnett’s (2015) critique of Manley and Johnston (2014), we revisit 
and reinterpret the census data at output area level for 2001 and 2011 to address the contentious 
issue of whether the capital’s social class geography is more accurately characterised by stability or 
change in that period. Emphasising the rather peculiar ways in which Manley and Johnston identify 
class divisions, we will show that using the approach – championed in Social Class in the 21st Century 
(Savage et al., 2015) - which is more attentive to class differentiation at the ‘top end’ of the class 
structure we can demonstrate an intensification of class differences at this end of the social 
spectrum within London and suggest an increase in socio-spatial separation in specific localised 
contexts. Manley and Johnston’s (2014) characterisation of stability within their defined tripartite 
schema across the period 2001 to 2011 is indeed helpful and accurate, but this image of tranquillity 
belies what actually appears to be a rather turbulent social landscape when we dig into the 
representative census data.   
 
1: Dissecting the London Elite  
The GBCS was a major internet-based survey conducted by the BBC between 2011 and 2013 under 
the direction of Mike Savage and Fiona Devine. The GBCS builds on a longer term body of work 
which re-asserts the centrality of social class and to place it firmly at the centre of our understanding 
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of inequality in the UK. There has been a flowering of literature on inequality at national and global 
levels in recent years (Clark with Heath 2014; Dorling 2011, 2014a; Piketty 2014; Sayer 2015; 
Wilkinson & Pickett 2009). Yet in all of these cases the notion of social class has either been elided or 
received no or peripheral attention. In part this can be seen as the legacy of sociological in-fighting 
over the nature and relevance of class since the 1980s, but ironically, it might also be read as the 
enduring success of political discourses from both left and right to steer the polity at large away 
from a clearer apprehension of the issue. Thus we can observe the spectacle of opposing 
Conservative and Labour leaders at either end of the 1990s rallying around the notion that class was 
dead or dying. At least for the Conservative John Major such a claim was couched in aspirational 
terms, as he strived in 1990 for ‘a classless society’ (Turner 2013: 1-2) Evidently this had been 
achieved just nine years later as his Labour successor Tony Blair proudly proclaimed that ‘the class 
war is over’ (BBC, 1999). During the 2000s it could be argued that the turn from social class 
intensified against the rise of individual and collective identities increasingly defined by 
consumerism and consumption (Bauman, 2007).  
So in a context in which a perfect storm of political, intellectual and economic forces had converged 
over the previous few decades to challenge the very concept of social class as a tool for 
understanding the UK’s social structure (Savage et al. 2015), the BBC was anxious to make sense of 
how class was being reconfigured. The survey, which benefitted from high profile publicity from the 
national broadcaster, drew an unprecedented response from the public, with 325,000 people 
responding to it over the course of two years. Analysis of the data resulted in the development of a 
‘New Model of Social Class’ (Savage et al. 2013) which promulgated a radically different conception 
of social class, not based on occupation and employment relations towards one based on stocks of 
economic, cultural and social ‘capitals’ along the lines advanced by the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu (1984). Analytically, the main focus of this work is to draw attention to the pulling away of 
an elite class at the top of the class structure from a more internally differentiated middle class (see 
especially Savage et al. 2015).     
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Figure 1 HERE: GBCS geographical skew in participation in relation to underlying working-age 
populations from the 2011 census at unitary authority level 
Table 1 HERE: Social skew within the GBCS web survey in comparison to a nationally-
representative sample 
 
Whilst extensive and unprecedented in both the scale of the response and the scope of questions 
asked, the GBCS is not a nationally representative dataset and is thus skewed towards those inclined 
and able to complete such an instrument (Savage et al., 2015). This skew has rightly been seen by 
critics as indicating limitations with the GBCS (e.g. Mills 2014)1. Nonetheless, this imbalance towards 
the well-educated and well off enhances the power of the GBCS to focus on the relationships and 
resources at the top end of the class structure (Savage et al. 2015). This is neatly revealed by Figure 
1, which presents a map showing the skew in terms of where people responded to the BBC’s online 
class survey by UK local authorities and demonstrates how many areas of London feature amongst 
those areas which replied to the survey in disproportionately high numbers relative to their 
underlying populations. It is clear that in London these areas map onto the most expensive and 
affluent boroughs in the capital, running from the inner city along a south-west transect to the 
Surrey border. Table 1 displays the socio-economic skew within the data in terms of the sort of 
people who took part in the GBCS and reveals a large over-representation of the senior managers 
and professionals. This shortcoming is a virtue in presenting us with a dataset of unique scale and 
scope for analysing the economic, social and cultural resources of the middle class, with nearly 
19,000 respondents in London alone falling within this (NS-SEC 1) category. No other source of data 
allows us such rich individual level data  to provide a critical anatomy of those at the very top of the 
capital’s social structure.    
Figure 2 HERE: Spatial distributions of the business & finance (top) and cultural (bottom) elites in 
London 
                                                          
1
 The ‘new model’ produced by Savage et al. (2013) has been extensively debated and criticised (e.g. Mills 
2014; Bradley 2014, as well as defended (Savage et al. 2015). The arguments in this paper use standard 
occupational National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) class categories also available from 
within the GBCS dataset and do not depend on the ‘New Class’ model. 
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We begin by breaking down the Senior Manager and Professional class into different occupational 
wings, to establish the extent of geographical clustering and separation between them2. We can 
contrast the business and finance with the cultural elite (Figure 2), which shows a very neat 
separation. The grey polygons indicate the upper quartile while the black shading shows the extents 
of the 90th percentile of the given population, thus providing a clear picture of where these groups 
reside in the greatest concentrations. The business and finance elite are disproportionately located 
in a central belt of northern London running up from the city, and then in a series of enclaves, 
several of which are in south-west London. By contrast, the cultural elite is much more closely 
affiliated to the inner northern and eastern districts of Camden in the north-west, through to 
Islington, Hackney and Whitechapel in the east.  
Figure 3 HERE: Spatial distributions of the medical (top) and legal (bottom) elites in London 
 
Having shown this difference, we can also see an overriding focus of both groups on the central 
areas of London. It is the central zones of the city which are now marked by the disproportionate 
presence of elite occupations. This pattern is generally evident too when we look at the geography 
of the medical and legal professions (Figure 3). The legal profession is the most centrally located of 
any of the occupational groups within NS-SEC 1. It is overwhelmingly focussed in central London 
near to the centres of the legal profession, but also in the City, Finsbury and extending north again 
to Islington. By contrast, medical practitioners largely eschew the most central zones of London, and 
are found in the relatively desirable and exclusive zone of gentrification north and south of the 
Thames.  
                                                          
2
 The Appendix contains a listing of the names and counts of the constituent occupations in each of the six 
categories used in this paper. The occupational titles supplied by individual GBCS respondents were 
standardised and classified according to the CASCOT (Computer Assisted Structured Coding Tool), hosted by 
the University of Warwick’s Institute for Employment Research. More information about CASCOT is available 
via their website: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ier/software/cascot/ (accessed 23 January 2016).  
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Figure 4 HERE: Spatial distributions of the public sector (top) and Technical (bottom) elites in 
London 
 
The final two groups, the public sector and the technical occupations (Figure 4) are also relatively 
dispersed from the centre of London. The public sector overlaps reasonably well with the medical 
practitioners (who will also tend to be public sector employees), whereas the technical occupations 
are mainly in a series of enclaves north of the Thames and south in Kennington, Clapham and 
Balham. 
A number of important findings can be gleaned from these six maps. Firstly, we can see a strong 
central London pull: this group lives in the high ground of the most exclusive and expensive areas in 
the middle of the city, underscoring the arguments of Cunningham and Savage (2015), and Savage et 
al. (2015), that the contemporary elite is fundamentally a central urban elite. Secondly, however, 
there are a series of enclaves which are also significant, though these vary according to the specific 
occupation being examined: for the business elite this tends to be the urban villages of south west 
London such as Richmond and Wimbledon; for the cultural elite it is areas such as Hackney, Bethnal 
Green and Hoxton. We can thus see a fascinating and complex elite occupational geography. Thirdly, 
there is an epicentre of the senior managerial and professional class as a whole, which is around 
Islington in North London. This part of London is over-represented for all six of the occupational 
profiles which comprise this NS-SEC 1 category. Yet it is interesting to note that the truly expensive 
areas of West London (such as Kensington and Chelsea) do not generally show up as clusters for any 
of our groups, with the exception of a few small enclaves. As research by others has identified 
(Atkinson 2015; Burrows 2013), it is precisely these areas of west London which are now becoming 
the playground of an absentee and socially-disengaged global ‘super-rich’. One of the implications of 
much of this revealing research is that much of west London is not so much a site of super-elite 
residence as it is a site of financial investment and generator/reflector of international social cachet 
for the sort of global super-rich who will not be represented in the GBCS. There is therefore an 
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implicit suggestion of a powerful east-west split at the heart of the capital which distinguishes the 
‘working’ elite, mainly oriented towards the north and east of London, with enclaves elsewhere, 
from the ‘silent’ super-elite and their real estate investments in the west of the city.     
Figure 5 HERE: Reference map of Greater London disaggregated by 2.5 kilometre bands centred on 
the Bank of England 
Figure 6 HERE: Percentage difference in observed versus expected distributions of the six elite 
occupational groups by distance from the Bank of England 
 
 
We can summarise these trends in Figure 6, which considers which of the six occupational groups 
were over or under represented at different distances from the centre of London. This is calculated 
by working out the difference in percentage terms between the observed distribution of each of the 
six occupational groups and what we would expect were each of those groups to conform to the 
distribution for NS-SEC 1 as a whole. Figure 5 is a reference map which provides a spatial context for 
these analyses.  
The legal elite stands out as clearly the most centrally located, with 80% more than we would expect 
within a 2.5 kilometre radius of the Bank of England in the heart of London’s financial district, but 
this drops precipitately and these groups are massively under-represented at the outskirts. By 
contrast, technical and public sector occupations are considerably under-represented in these 
central arenas, but their share increases considerably in the more suburban locations towards the 
periphery of London. 
These maps appear to indicate, fairly clearly and directly, that the most elite occupations are focused 
in the central-north-eastern sector of London, so that we can usefully identify London as a central 
site for elite formation. We choose this particular word quite deliberately because we believe that 
location is not simply incidental to these occupational identities, but that space can become integral 
to their very conception. This is an idea that has been elaborated by Savage et al. (2005: 45) in their 
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work on the Manchester middle class through the concept of ‘elective belonging’. For people of 
means, property allows them the freedom to live alongside people with whom they share much 
more than a favourable income; they also frequently share common cultural practises and tastes, 
social networks, and as we see here – occupations. The breadth of the GBCS data enables us to look 
well beyond occupation however, to address the complex and contingent interplay of economic, 
cultural and social capitals (Bourdieu 1984) between these different elite groups. The findings are 
below and are very revealing.  
Figure 7 HERE: Mean household income for each of the six occupational groups by distance from 
the Bank of England 
 
Figure 7 shows how the household income of these six groups varies, again according to how far 
they live from the centre of London, and reveal an intriguing distinction between the legal and 
business elite, on the one hand, and the other occupations. For those working in the public sector, 
technical occupations and in the cultural elite, income levels are broadly similar regardless of how 
far you live from central London. By contrast, the business & finance and legal elites who live in the 
centre tend to earn much more than those who live further away. This slope is especially apparent 
for the legal elite, who earn over £100k if they live in the centre, but earn on average under £70k 
when living some 25 kilometres away, out near the Greater London boundary. The medical 
profession is intriguing also, in that it tends to earn the most about 15km from the centre, in the 
established enclaves of suburban London which we have already seen it tends to prefer (see Figure 
3).  
Figure 7 demonstrates further that in central London, income differences between the legal, 
business and financial elite and the other senior managerial and professional occupations are huge: 
lawyers earn nearly double the household income of the public sector occupations. By contrast, 
some 25 kilometres out, these differences are much less marked and there is a distinctive 
convergence of these different occupational profiles. Here again we see the subtle stamping of 
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central London as marked fundamentally by the economic power of particular configurations of the 
elite middle class: the imprint of business, finance, and the law. 
Figure 8 HERE: Mean highbrow cultural capital score for each of the six occupational groups by 
distance from the Bank of England 
 
This point about the distinctiveness of London’s central zones is underscored by Figure 8 which 
shows how the ‘high’ cultural capital (Savage et al. 2013) of the different occupational groups varies 
as they move away from central London. High cultural capital refers to an engagement with 
traditional ‘legitimate’ forms of cultural engagement such as attending theatre and opera 
performances, art galleries, museums and so on. Such a measure may appear clichéd and 
anachronistic at face value, but in fact is anything but. Engagement with these sorts of activities 
endow benefits which can ultimately translate into other forms of capital accumulation as a 
familiarity with these legitimate and canonical forms of culture can help the children of middle-class 
parents navigate through an educational system which is still focussed on an appreciation of them 
(savage et al. 2015: 95-96). It is also becoming evident that even amongst graduates with similar 
levels of educational attainment, barriers appear to exist for working-class young people in attaining 
access to the most prestigious and competitive roles in the business, media and cultural sectors, 
barriers which appear to map very precisely onto Bourdieusian notions of cultural capital (SMCPC 
2015).  
Again, the trends here are clear, and fascinating. The only group which is an outlier by this measure 
are the technical occupations, where are in general less attracted to highbrow cultural capital than 
the rest. And for all the six occupational groups, there is a compelling trend which sees the trendy 
inner-city neighbourhoods of Camden, Islington and Hackney at the apex of highbrow cultural capital 
in London, after which there is a steady distance decay effect towards the city stopline and the 
distant fringes of Croydon, Kingston, Uxbridge and the like. This marker of cultural engagement 
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provides the first quantitative evidence for a long-established reading of London’s purlieus which 
stretches from The Waste Land to The Buddha of Suburbia (Pope 2015).  
 
London’s Intensifying Class Geographies 
Having clarified the significance of elite formation, let us now return to the debate in these pages, 
which has largely focused on the issue as to whether London is becoming more ‘middle class’ or not. 
This issue has been confounded by the fact that as Hamnett (2015) notes, Manley and Johnston 
(2014) present an alternative vision of the ‘service class’ to that traditionally understood by the term. 
Manley and Johnston (2014) identify three classes: a ‘middle class’ (of professionals and managers, 
which would normally be identified as the ‘service class’), a ‘service class’ composed of occupations 
in the middle of the occupational structure (which would normally be identified as ‘intermediate’), 
and a working class.  
Figure 9 HERE: Intensification of the social class structure of London between 2001 and 2011 for: a) 
NS-SEC I, b) NS-SEC 2, c) NS-SEC 3-5, and d) NS-SEC 6 & 7 
 
The GBCS cannot be used to examine trends over time, but we can use census data to examine this 
question. The census has been used also by Manley and Johnston and by Hamnett, however we will 
be using a categorisation informed by our concern to examine how elite formation also intersects 
with the wider middle and working classes. In Figure 9 we therefore provide four maps which 
present a more sociologically nuanced analysis of change between 2001 and 2011 and which do not 
use the confusing class terms deployed by Manley and Johnston. Instead, we differentiate between 
NS-SEC 1, the high professional and managerial class, and the most elite of the NS-SEC occupational 
classes (which has been the focus of our analysis above), and NS-SEC 2, the lower professional and 
managerial service class. It is important to distinguish between NS-SEC 1 and NS-SEC 2 since the 
former, as the most ‘elite’ occupational grouping is by general agreement, becoming increasingly 
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segregated from the rest of the population not only in terms of income and social advantages more 
generally (see Savage 2015) but potentially also in terms of space. To contrast with these two most 
advantaged groups, we then focus on a broad ‘middle class’ of NS-SEC 3-5, and a working class of 
NS-SEC 6 & 7 which is the poorest and least advantaged. This allows a more consistent and 
sociologically robust way of examining trends over time, using official NS-SEC measures whilst also 
being attentive to our key assertion as to the significance of the elite pulling away from the rest of 
the middle classes. 
If we use these numbers to examine the overall class structure of London in the first decade of the 
21st century, we find some evidence of the stability than Manley and Johnston (2014) have identified, 
but the picture is also more complex. Figure 9 (a-d) employs the same Getis-Ord Gi* technique used 
by Manley and Johnston (2014) in their analyses. However, we have adapted the method slightly. 
The maps identify output areas which existed as either positive (shades of red) or negative (shades 
of blue) clusters of for each class population in 2001 but that then witnessed varying gradations of 
intensification in those clusters as measured by changes in their Z scores in the decade to 2011. So, 
in essence, we are highlighting those parts of the city that were disproportionately populated by one 
of the four class groups in 2001 and where those groups became even more dominant over the 
course of the following ten years.  
Figure 9a thus shows the changing distribution of higher professionals and managers between 2001 
and 2011, with the red areas showing over-representation and greater concentration, and bluer 
areas showing under-representation compounded by declining concentration. In general, the yellow 
and red areas are towards the centre of London, whilst the bluer areas are towards the outside, so 
indicating how the relationship between elites and central London locations is growing more intense 
over time, although taken in isolation the pattern appears relatively moderate. Most of the city does 
not fall within this bracket. There are also two contrasting outliers in north-west and north east 
London which are worthy of note.  
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Figure 9b provides an equivalent map for NS-SEC 2, the lower professional and managerial service 
class. This shows an even more marked shift of locations towards the centre of London, and a 
distinctive weakening of their presence in the outer areas of the city. We can also detect something 
of a shift from east to west. It is perhaps surprising that it is NS-SEC 2, rather than NS-SEC1 which 
sees the most dramatic concentration in Central London, given our earlier findings from the GBCS 
about the predominance of NS-SEC1 in the central areas. This partly reflects the fact that the NS-SEC 
1 occupations were already highly concentrated in central districts in 2001. Taken together, NS-SEC 1 
and 2, the broad professional and managerial service class, clearly tightened their grip on inner 
London between 2001 and 2011. The picture changes radically when we examine the spatial 
distribution of the ‘middle’ or ‘intermediate’ class’ (Figure 9c). Here the centre of London saw an 
exodus in the first decade of the 21st century hand-in-glove with a clear and marked intensification in 
the cheaper and less desirable eastern and southern suburbs. Such a trend is also evident in the 
patterns of intensification and de-intensification for the working class (Figure 9d), albeit more 
modest in scale.  
Figure 10 HERE: Intensification of the class structure of London between 2001 and 2011 for all NS-
SEC classes I - VII 
Figure 11 HERE: Percentage share of polarising output areas for each NS-SEC category in Inner and 
Outer London 
Table 2 HERE: Percentage share of stable positive and negative cluster cells further polarising 
Table 3 HERE: Percentage share of stable non-cluster cells for all four NS-SeC categories 
 
Table 2 shows the percentage of all output areas across London that were positive (over-
representative) or negative (under-representative) clusters for each of our four classes and which 
further polarised over the following decade. So for Ns-SeC 2 for example, 21 percent of all output 
areas in London became further polarised over the years between 2001 and 2011. Whilst, this might 
appear modest in isolation, let us put the figure in some context. In comparison to this figure, Table 
3 tells us that only five percent of all output areas in London in 2001 could be described as truly 
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balanced in representing an equilibrium between the four class groups and not existing as positive or 
negative clusters for any of the them. This figure dropped slightly in the decade to 2011.  
It is only by drawing the patterns together in Figure 10 that we can grasp the true magnitude of 
social class intensification across London as whole. This presents the absolute sum of changes in 
standard deviations in output areas that represented positive or negative clusters for one of the four 
groups in 2001 and which became progressively more dominated by that group by 2011. So rather 
than a picture of stability we are presented with an image of a city in a state of considerable social 
flux in class terms, a picture which we would argue presents an altogether more realistic, if rather 
less harmonious representation of the state of affairs in our uneven capital. Such an interpretation is 
further underlined in Figure 11 which shows the distribution in polarising output areas by location in 
either Inner or Outer London.3 There is clearly a pronounced geography to where certain class 
groups are becoming more concentrated, and for the middle class  
(NS-SEC 1 and 2), this is clearly within the ring of Inner London boroughs. For the service (NS-SEC 3-
5) and working classes (NS-SEC 6&7), polarisation is occurring overwhelmingly on the margins of the 
capital.  
We conclude our analyses by drawing on the use of segregation indices to graphically underline our 
point. We have deployed the dissimilarity index, which Peach (2009) argues remains one of the most 
authoritative techniques in the social sciences. The dissimilarity index is a measure of evenness of a 
given group within the population as whole, and can be expressed thus, 
1
2
𝐷𝑎𝑏 = ∑ |100
𝑃𝑎  
𝑖
𝑃𝑎
∗  − 100
𝑃𝑏
𝑖
𝑃𝑏
∗|
𝑁
 𝑖=1
     
 
                                                          
3
 We use the Office of National Statistics’ definition of Inner and Outer London, available online at: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/beginner-s-guide/administrative/england/greater-
london-and-the-london-boroughs/map-of-greater-london.pdf (accessed 1 February 2016). 
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where, for example,  Dab is the dissimilarity index for NS-SEC 1; 𝑃𝑎
𝑖  is the NS-SEC 1 population, a in 
output area, i; b is the rest of the working-age population and * indicates the entire Greater London 
area. Using the above formula will provide a percentage figure of the entire NS-SEC 1 population 
that would need to move in order for there to be a perfectly even distribution across all output 
areas. Applying the dissimilarity index to the four NS-SEC groupings we have used in this paper from 
the 2001 and 2011 censuses provides the results in Figure 12. The tables show a pronounced 
upward shift in levels of unevenness across London’s social class structure and that the groups which 
have become most segregated within the city are those with, quite literally, the least purchase in an 
increasingly unsustainable and unfair housing market (Dorling 2014). We should also remember that 
such an increase has come against a backdrop of what all authors in this debate agree has been a 
broad stable increase in the city’s class structure in abolute terms. However, it is important to also 
acknowledge the limitations of measures sure as the dissimilarity index, in potentially providing a 
misleading image of segregation in the city. Such a conclusion would be unwise, particularly over 
such a limited timescale. Manley et al. (2015) have conducted detailed analyses of these patterns 
using a range of different measures and conclude that the picture between 2001 and 2011 is indeed, 
largely one of stasis. It is likely therefore that this is more representatve of the sort of widespread 
and complex patterns of localised social re-organisation suggested by Figure 10. So whilst we should 
be cautious of reading too much into this figure alone, with Poulsen and Johnston (2006: 2195) 
rightly questioning the value of single metrics in shedding light on the ‘everyday experience’ of 
group membership and residence, we would conclude by arguing that in this paper we have 
nonetheless presented a multi-dimensional protrait of a city pulling apart across a number of 
different domains: the economic, cultural, social and residential. The evidence drawn from very 
different datasets suggests subtle cleavage over convergence. 
Figure 12 HERE: Dissimilarity indices for the four NS-SEC classifications in 2001 and 2011 
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Conclusions 
This paper has used differing and complimentary data sources to show that there have been major 
changes within London’s class structure over recent years, and that elite formation lies at the heat of 
this. In this conception of social class, space is not simply the empty vessel in which action occurs but 
rather has an instrumental role in explaining and driving patterns of residential concentration. The 
recent debate within this journal around the nature of London’s class geography has importantly 
directed our attention to the need to understand social change within the capital, but it has 
infuriatingly focused on the middle levels of the class structure, rather than on the more 
fundamental changes taking place at the higher levels. We have addressed this by using the GBCS to 
focus on the distinctive features of London’s elite geography in the years 2001 to 2011, which 
powerfully shows how central London is a very distinctive elite space, characterised by a profound 
over-representation of those in legal, business and financial occupations. Their resources are 
mappable through the GBCS dataset and this shows that those resources extend beyond the 
economic and into the realm of cultural capital. These analyses point to clear patterns of intra-stratal 
spatial segmentation within the middle classes have been overlooked in previous contributions.  
We have also used our classification of the NS-SEC, which pulls out the ‘elite’ NS-SEC 1 category from 
the rest of the middle classes to localised patterns of intensification taking place in the capital across 
the entire class structure. In place of the traditional or conventional understanding of central urban 
space as somewhat disreputable, we now see the consolidation of elite centrality, with the less 
advantaged social classes increasingly moving to the outskirts. While these competing centripetal 
forces can throw elites together in complex social-cultural configurations in the core opposing 
centrifugal dynamics have the potential to push those lower down the social hierarchy ever closure 
to the edge. We would argue that these stark trends need to be placed at the heart of our 
understanding of social change in London at the start of the twenty-first century.  
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Figures 
  
Figure 1: GBCS geographical skew in participation in relation to underlying working-age populations 
from the 2011 census at unitary authority level 
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Figure 2: Spatial distributions of the business & finance (top) and cultural (bottom) elites in London 
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Figure 3: Spatial distributions of the medical (top) and legal (bottom) elites in London 
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Figure 4: Spatial distributions of the public sector (top) and Technical (bottom) elites in London 
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Figure 5: Reference map of Greater London disaggregated by 2.5 kilometre bands centred on the 
Bank of England 
  
 
Figure 6: Percentage difference in observed versus expected distributions of the six elite occupational 
groups by distance from the Bank of England 
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Figure 7: Mean household income for each of the six occupational groups by distance from the Bank 
of England 
 
 
Figure 8: Mean highbrow cultural capital score for each of the six occupational groups by distance 
from the Bank of England 
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Figure 9: Intensification of the social class structure of London between 2001 and 2011 for: a) NS-SeC I, b) NS-SeC II, c) NS-SeC III-V, and d) NS-SeC VI & VII 
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Figure 10: Intensification of the class structure of London between 2001 and 2011 for all NS-SeC 
classes I – VII 
 
 
Figure 11: Percentage shares of positively polarising output areas for each NS-SEC category in Inner 
and Outer London 
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Figure 12: Dissimilarity indices for the four NS-SeC classifications in 2001 and 2011  
 
 
Tables 
Category/group in %  Web sample  National sample Ratio 
Senior manager 13 6.3 2.1 
Traditional professional 17.9 4.8 3.7 
Modern professional 31.5 18.1 1.7 
Middle/junior manager 8.1 6.7 1.2 
Intermediate 11 14.7 0.7 
Technical & craft worker 2.4 10.6 0.2 
Semi-routine worker 4.9 15.3 0.3 
Routine worker 3.2 14.5 0.2 
Never worked 7.8 8.3 0.9 
 
Table 1: Social skew within the GBCS web survey in comparison to a nationally-representative sample 
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 POSITIVE & NEGATIVE CLUSTERS  
NS-SEC Polarising 
 
n % 
1 2,860 11.8 
2 5,081 21.0 
3,4,5 3,070 12.7 
6,7 1,874 7.8 
 
Table 2: Percentage share of stable positive and negative cluster cells further polarising  
        
NON-CLUSTER CELLS 
2001 2011 
n % n % 
1,245 5.2 1,179 4.9 
 
Table 3: Percentage share of stable non-cluster cells for all four NS-SeC categories 
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Appendix 
MEDICAL n % % (cum.) 
Dental practitioners 42 4.7 4.7 
Health associate 
professionals n.e.c. 
1 .1 4.8 
Health professionals n.e.c. 17 1.9 6.7 
Medical practitioners 651 73.1 79.8 
Medical radiographers 3 .3 80.1 
Midwives 5 .6 80.7 
Nurses 16 1.8 82.5 
Occupational therapists 1 .1 82.6 
Pharmacists 49 5.5 88.1 
Psychologists 66 7.4 95.5 
Speech and language 
therapists 
1 .1 95.6 
Therapy professionals n.e.c. 16 1.8 97.4 
Veterinarians 23 2.6 100.0 
Total 891 100.0   
 
CULTURAL n % % (cum.) 
Actors, entertainers and presenters 6 .9 .9 
Advertising accounts managers and 
creative directors 
36 5.6 6.6 
Advertising and public relations 
directors 
58 9.0 15.6 
Archivists and curators 11 1.7 17.3 
Artists 3 .5 17.8 
Arts officers, producers and directors 119 18.6 36.3 
Authors, writers and translators 49 7.6 44.0 
Conference and exhibition managers 
and organisers 
76 11.9 55.9 
Dancers and choreographers 2 .3 56.2 
Fitness instructors 1 .2 56.3 
Graphic designers 10 1.6 57.9 
IT engineers 1 .2 58.0 
Journalists, newspaper and periodical 
editors 
167 26.1 84.1 
Musicians 3 .5 84.6 
Nursery nurses and assistants 5 .8 85.3 
Photographers, audio-visual and 
broadcasting equipment operators 
4 .6 86.0 
Product, clothing and related 
designers 
16 2.5 88.5 
Public relations professionals 74 11.5 100.0 
Total 641 100.0   
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BUSINESS & FINANCE n % % (cum.) 
Brokers 134 2.0 2.0 
Business and financial project 
management professionals 
610 9.1 11.1 
Business and related associate 
professionals n.e.c. 
257 3.8 14.9 
Business sales executives 80 1.2 16.1 
Buyers and procurement officers 35 .5 16.6 
Chief executives and senior officials 725 10.8 27.4 
Estate agents and auctioneers 12 .2 27.6 
Estimators, valuers and assessors 46 .7 28.3 
Finance and investment analysts and 
advisers 
299 4.4 32.7 
Financial accounts managers 257 3.8 36.5 
Financial and accounting technicians 59 .9 37.4 
Financial institution managers and 
directors 
63 .9 38.3 
Financial managers and directors 397 5.9 44.2 
Functional managers and directors 
n.e.c. 
251 3.7 48.0 
Human resource managers and 
directors 
198 2.9 50.9 
Insurance underwriters 73 1.1 52.0 
Management consultants and 
business analysts 
596 8.9 60.9 
Managers and directors in transport 
and distribution 
14 .2 61.1 
Marketing and sales directors 1318 19.6 80.7 
Marketing associate professionals 173 2.6 83.3 
Office managers 50 .7 84.0 
Office supervisors 38 .6 84.6 
Personal assistants and other 
secretaries 
47 .7 85.3 
Production managers and directors in 
manufacturing 
331 4.9 90.2 
Purchasing managers and directors 48 .7 90.9 
Sales accounts and business 
development managers 
453 6.7 97.6 
Taxation experts 158 2.4 100.0 
Total 6722 100.0   
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LEGAL n % % (cum.) 
Barristers and judges 314 13.4 13.4 
Chartered and certified accountants 451 19.2 32.7 
Legal associate professionals 114 4.9 37.5 
Legal professionals n.e.c. 228 9.7 47.2 
Solicitors 1236 52.8 100.0 
Total 2343 100.0   
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TECHNICAL n % % (cum.) 
Actuaries, economists and statisticians 269 8.6 8.6 
Architects 234 7.5 16.2 
Architectural and town planning technicians 45 1.4 17.6 
Business and related research professionals 309 9.9 27.5 
Business, research and administrative professionals n.e.c. 201 6.5 34.0 
Chartered surveyors 145 4.7 38.7 
Civil engineers 99 3.2 41.9 
Construction and building trades n.e.c. 18 .6 42.4 
Design and development engineers 28 .9 43.3 
Draughtspersons 16 .5 43.8 
Electrical and electronic trades n.e.c. 16 .5 44.4 
Electricians and electrical fitters 21 .7 45.0 
Engineering professionals n.e.c. 152 4.9 49.9 
Environment professionals 28 .9 50.8 
Information technology and telecommunications directors 63 2.0 52.8 
Information technology and telecommunications professionals 
n.e.c. 
160 5.1 58.0 
IT business analysts, architects and systems designers 123 4.0 61.9 
IT operations technicians 57 1.8 63.8 
IT project and programme managers 32 1.0 64.8 
IT specialist managers 194 6.2 71.0 
IT user support technicians 24 .8 71.8 
Laboratory technicians 20 .6 72.5 
Mechanical engineers 53 1.7 74.2 
Metal working production and maintenance fitters 84 2.7 76.9 
Other skilled trades n.e.c. 8 .3 77.1 
Planning, process and production technicians 12 .4 77.5 
Production and process engineers 41 1.3 78.8 
Programmers and software development professionals 276 8.9 87.7 
Quality assurance and regulatory professionals 113 3.6 91.3 
Quality control and planning engineers 16 .5 91.8 
Quantity surveyors 41 1.3 93.2 
Research and development managers 120 3.9 97.0 
Science, engineering and production technicians n.e.c. 18 .6 97.6 
Telecommunications engineers 19 .6 98.2 
Town planning officers 46 1.5 99.7 
Web design and development professionals 10 .3 100.0 
Total 3111 100.0   
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PUBLIC SECTOR n % % (cum.) 
Biological scientists and biochemists 94 8.1 8.1 
Education advisers and school 
inspectors 
14 1.2 9.3 
Further education teaching 
professionals 
151 13.0 22.2 
Health services and public health 
managers and directors 
28 2.4 24.6 
Higher education teaching 
professionals 
156 13.4 38.0 
Housing officers 6 .5 38.5 
Librarians 31 2.7 41.2 
National government administrative 
occupations 
125 10.7 51.9 
Natural and social science 
professionals n.e.c. 
208 17.8 69.7 
Officers in armed forces 41 3.5 73.2 
Physical scientists 50 4.3 77.5 
Police officers (sergeant and below) 3 .3 77.8 
Primary and nursery education 
teaching professionals 
25 2.1 79.9 
Protective service associate 
professionals n.e.c. 
16 1.4 81.3 
Public services associate professionals 52 4.5 85.8 
Secondary education teaching 
professionals 
35 3.0 88.8 
Senior professionals of educational 
establishments 
66 5.7 94.4 
Social and humanities scientists 16 1.4 95.8 
Social workers 2 .2 96.0 
Special needs education teaching 
professionals 
2 .2 96.1 
Teaching and other educational 
professionals n.e.c. 
12 1.0 97.2 
Welfare and housing associate 
professionals n.e.c. 
28 2.4 99.6 
Welfare professionals n.e.c. 2 .2 99.7 
Youth and community workers 3 .3 100.0 
Total 1166 100.0   
     
 
 
 
